Matthews v. Sallaz Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43311 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-17-2015
Matthews v. Sallaz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43311
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Matthews v. Sallaz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43311" (2015). Not Reported. 2542.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2542
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TERRENCE MATTHEWS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, DARYL SALLAZ, 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
INC., RANDOLF LEWIS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43311 
Fourth Dist. Case No. CV OC 13-06926 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
for the County of Ada 
Honorable Patrick H. Owen, District Judge, Presiding 
TERRENCE MATTHEWS 
4 Goldfork Circle Drive #4 
Idaho City, Idaho 83716 
Telephone: (208) 353-7435 
Facsimile: 
Email: 
APPELLANT PRO SE 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-PAGE 1 
GARY L. QUIGLEY 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1296 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-1296 
Telephone: 208-884-5679 
Facsimile: 208-884-5728 
Email: gqresearch@rocketmail.com 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
FILE • COPY 
DEC 1 7 2015 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Cases and Authorities 3-4 
Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Course of Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 
Statement of the Facts 
Standard of Review 
8-18 
18-19 
Issue Presented on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment For The Defendant 
Respondents On The Basis Of Res Judicata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
B. The Appellant Matthews Has Failed To Raise Any Issue On This Appeal That Has 
Challenged Decision Of The District Court In Granting Summary Judgment To The 
Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
C. The Respondents Are Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On Appeal Under 
LC.§ 12-12-121 ...................................................... 38 
D. This Court Should Impose Sanctions Under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 Against The 
Appellant Matthews For Pursing Issues That He Does Not Have Standing To Raise 
and Present To The Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 2 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P.3d 630 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500,328 P.3d 480 (2014) .................. 25 
Baird Oil Co., Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm., 144 Idaho 229, 159 P.3d 866 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, 154 Idaho 824, 303 P .3d 183 (2013) . 19, 31 
Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,973 P.2d 142 (1999) ..................... 39 
Clarkv. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,715 P.2d 993 (1986) ................................ 20 
Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct.App. 1989) ........................ 18 
Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223,254 P.3d 1219 (2011) .............................. 38 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher, 157 Idaho 577,338 P.3d 556 (2014) ..... 31 
Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Construction, Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 158 P.3d 947 (2007) ........ 32 
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 13 8 Idaho 27, 56 P .3d 1277 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 639(2015) . . . . . . 38 
Kolar v. Cassia County, Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 31 
Kootenai Electric Cooperative v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 219 P .3d 440 (2009) . . . . . . 21 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P .2d 1078 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 
Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 265 P .3d 114 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc., 158 Idaho, 92,343 P.3d 1099 (2015) ................... 7-8 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 3 
Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d 907 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Steuererv. Richards, 155 Idaho 280,311 P.3d292 (2013) ........................ 38-39 
Waller v. Dept of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 192 P.3d 1058 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 18-19 
Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,684 P.2d 314 (Ct.App.1984) .......................... 22 
Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53,244 P.3d 197 (2010) .............................. 16 
Youngbloodv. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665,182 P.3d 1199 (2008) ......................... 21 
STATUTES 
J.C.§ 12-121 ..................................................... 5, 7, 19, 38, 40 
J.C. § 18-3601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
I.C.§18-5401 .............................................................. 24 
COURT RULES 
I.A.R. 11.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 40, 42, 43 
I.A.R. 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
I.A.R. 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 
I.A.R.41 .................................................................. 38 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF PAGE 4 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In the proceeding below the Appellant Terrence Matthews claimed damages from the 
Respondents arising from his loss of a residential property located at 1911 2nd Street South, Nampa, 
Idaho ("the Nampa property") as the result of a deed of trust foreclosure that occurred in March 
2013. Matthews based his claims for these damages on allegations of forgery, perjury, abuse of 
process, and wrongful foreclosure as related to the matters determined in the previous adjudications 
of an attorney's lien foreclosure in Canyon County (2009), and in an accounting action in Ada 
County (2011 ). Matthews requested summary judgment on each of his four claims, but the District 
Court ruled that each of Matthews' claims was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and instead 
entered judgment for the Defendant/Respondents, and also granted the Defendant/Respondents' 
request for an award of attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-121, and then dismissed the action. This 
appeal arises from the judgment that was entered. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Appellant Matthews commenced this action by filing a complaint in Fourth District 
Court, Ada County, on April 18, 2013 (R., pp. 7-13), incorporating into his complaint a number of 
attachments related to the prior court proceedings underlying Matthews' claims, as alleged in that 
complaint. (R., pp. 14-33). 
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The named Defendants filed an answer to the original Complaint on December 16, 2013 (R., 
pp. 37-42). 
Shortly thereafter, on December 30, 2013, Matthews filed his original motion for summary 
judgment. (R., pp. 43-51 ). This first motion for summary judgment was never heard due to 
Matthews' request to file and proceed on an amended complaint. Matthews' second motion for 
summary judgment, and the Defendants' response, were each respectively filed and served, prior to 
the actual filing of the amended complaint, resulting in a procedural delay in the case. (R., pg. 3). 
The Amended Complaint was filed by Matthews on September 8, 2014 (R., pp. 52-63). The 
Defendants filed their Answer on September 10, 2014 (R., pp. 64-69). 
Matthews filed his motion for summary judgment on October 20, 2014, as supported by his 
own affidavit, and a memorandum, neither of which has been made a part of the record on this 
appeal (R., pg. 4). The Defendant/Respondents filed an opposing memorandum (R., pp. 70-93), and 
the Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz (R., pp. 94-111). Oral argument was held on December 30, 2014 
on that motion for summary judgment. (R., pg. 4). 
On March 4, 2015 the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order, in which 
it granted summary judgment to the Defendants (R., pp. 112-130). Judgment was entered on March 
13, 2015 (R., pp. 131-32). 
Matthews filed a timely motion for reconsideration on March 19, 2015 (R., pp. 133-165), 
which the District Court denied on April 27, 2015 (R., pg. 5). Matthews then filed a second motion 
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for reconsideration on May 7, 2015, which was denied by the District Court May 19, 2015 (R., pp. 
166-68). 
The Defendants requested and were awarded attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121, which 
award has not been challenged by Matthews on this appeal. (R., pg. 6). 
Matthews filed his Notice of Appeal on June 4, 2015 (R., pp. 169-173). 
In reviewing this matter on Matthews' motion for summary judgment, and on the 
Defendant/Respondents' request for entry of summary judgment on the basis of res judicata, the 
District Court requested and reviewed the court files from the earlier civil proceedings in the 
Matthews' 2002 Canyon County divorce decree and appeal (Canyon County Case No. CV-2001-
0008434); the 2009 Canyon County lien foreclosure judgment and sheriffs sale; (Canyon County 
Case No. CV-2009-4375); and in the 2011 Ada County accounting action (Ada County Case No. 
CV-OC2011-00140). 
Concerning these earlier case files, the District Court made the following declaration 
concerning the record created by the materials the court had reviewed from those files: 
The Court will take judicial notice of the contents of these files as referenced herein. 
I.R.E. 201. The copies of the Canyon County files are made a part of this court file. 
(R., pg. 113). Portions of those Canyon County court files, as requested in the Appellant's Notice 
of Appeal (R., pp. 171-173), have been submitted as an exhibit to the Appellant's record that is 
contained on a single CD-ROM (R., pp. 174-75), and as such, comprise a part of the record on 
appeal in this case. Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc., 158 Idaho, 92, 98-99, 343 P.3d 1099, 1105-06 
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(2015). Within the 880 unnumbered pages that comprise this exhibit are several documents, 
including judgments, findings, deeds, discovery, & depositions, which further substantiate the 
decision of the District Court below that the claims which Matthews attempted to raise in that action 
were all barred by res judicata, and therefore were properly dismissed. As cited herein, the 
documents contained in this unnumbered exhibit will be cited as they sequentially appear on that 
CD-ROM ("Ex. pg. /880"). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts which underlie the decision of the District Court that is before this Court 
on appeal concerning the District Court's application of res judicata primarily involve the 
determination matters that were raised and decided in three earlier cases that involved a Nampa 
residential property in which the Appellant Matthews was a part owner between 1999 and 2013, 
when the Idaho Housing Finance Association ("IHF A") foreclosed upon the deed of trust on which 
Matthews had been the sole obligor that entire time. 
As set out in the findings of the District Court below (R., pg. 114), the Appellant Terrence 
Matthews acquired the Nampa property, as located at 1911 2nd Street South, in 1999 from William 
Boyd Friend1 by warranty deed. That warranty deed was dated August 26, 1999 and was recorded 
in the Canyon County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. 009934728 on August 27, 1999. Critical 
The District Court's decision identifies the grantor as, "William Boyd French" (Tr., 
pg. 114). A copy of the warranty deed, is found in an exhibit within the documents related to the 
2002 divorce proceeding and on that deed the grantor's last name is listed name as, "Friend." (Ex., 
pg. 832/880). 
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to the claims that Matthews has repeatedly asserted in the various actions in which he has been 
involved in the lower courts, and again attempts to raise on this appeal, is the apparent fact that no 
one - other than Matthews himself - has ever been legally obligated to make make payment on the 
"mortgage debt," as secured by the deed of trust on this Nampa property.2 
The records in Canyon County indicate that Matthews conveyed an ownership interest in the 
Nampa property to his ex-wife (referred to herein as either, "Jacqueline" or "Mitchell") by a 
quitclaim deed executed in September 1999, about ten months prior to their July 2000 marriage, and 
less than one month after Matthews had acquired the property by warranty deed in August 1999 from 
William Boyd Friend. This September 10, 1999 quitclaim deed, which was recorded in the Canyon 
County Recorder's Office on September 13, 1999 as Instrument No. 009936865, indicated their then-
respective status, as an "unmarried man," and "unmarried woman." A copy of this quitclaim deed 
was attached to Matthews' August 16, 2002 deposition, as taken in the parties' divorce proceeding. 
(Ex., pg. 787/880). 
Again, the District Court, in the proceeding below, clearly indicated that, "It does not appear 
that Jacqueline had or assumed any obligation to pay the IHF A note." (R., pg. 114). 
2 No actual copy of the promissory note or deed of trust was identified in the records 
submitted in the record on appeal, but the deed of trust is referenced in the 2009 Canyon County lien 
foreclosure action complaint (Ex., pg. 53/880). As indicated in the argument submitted by the 
Appellant Matthews in his opening brief, the District Court in deciding this matter found the fact that 
only Matthews was ever obligated on the underlying deed of trust obligation to be determinative. 
No transcripts of those hearings before the District Comi have been provided as a part of the record 
on appeal. 
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The Matthews and Mitchell marriage was of relative short duration, lasting a little over two 
years from the July 18, 2000 date of marriage until the December 2, 2002 date of the divorce decree. 
Jacqueline Mitchell had retained Dennis Sallaz to represent her in the divorce action. (Terrence J 
Matthews v. Jacqueline Matthews, Third Dist. Canyon County Case No. CV-2001-0008434). In the 
divorce action Judge Kotyk determined that the Nampa property that is at the center of this dispute 
was community property (Ex. pg. 699/880) a finding that Matthews never contested on his 
subsequent appeal of that judgment to the Idaho Court of Appeals (Docket No. 32517) (Ex., pp. 662-
68/880). The November 8, 2006 decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals was delayed for a period 
of time because of Matthews' intervening voluntary bankruptcy, In Re Terrence James Matthews, 
Case No. 03-00998 JDP (Bkrtcy,D.lda.), commenced on March 24, 2003. The Court of Appeals in 
its decision permitted Matthews to renew his request that the community property be divided rather 
than sold (Ct. of Appeals, Slip Opn. at pg. 7) (Ex., pg. 668/880). On remand Judge Kotyk again 
entered an order authorizing Matthews to sell the Nampa property with the net proceeds to be placed 
in an interest bearing account to be divided between the parties. (R., pp. 114-15; Ex. pp 654-
55/880). As subsequent events have demonstrated, the Nampa property was never voluntarily sold. 
Mitchell had not paid Sallaz for his legal services in representing her in the divorce action. 
On August 2, 2002, Sallaz Law, Chtd. recorded an attorney's lien against Mitchell's undivided one-
half interest in the Nampa property. That lien was recorded as Instrument No. 200235269 in the 
records of the Canyon County Recorder. (R., pg. 115) (ex. pg. 42/880). 
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This attorney's fee lien, and its ultimate foreclosure, as only imposed against Mitchell's 
undivided half interest in the Nampa property, is the primary source of the claims and issues that 
have been repeatedly raised by Matthews in the proceedings below and that have now led to this 
appeal. 
There has existed - and apparently continues to exist tremendous confusion and 
misunderstanding on the part of Matthews concerning: (1) his ownership interest in the Nampa 
property at various times during the several proceedings conducted below; (2) the relationship of the 
Sallaz attorney's fee lien to Matthews' ownership interest in the Nampa property; (3) Matthews' 
right and ability to challenge the foreclosure of that attorney's fee lien; and ( 4) the claim that this lien 
had only been imposed upon the undivided half interest in that Nampa property that had been 
awarded to Matthews now ex-wife, Jacqueline Mitchell, in their 2002 divorce action. 
From the moment after the entry of their 2002 divorce decree forward until Matthews title 
to the Nampa property was finally extinguished by the 2013 IHF A foreclosure, he has held an 
undivided half interest in the Nampa property, as a tenant in common, first with his ex-wife, 
Mitchell, then with National Financial, Inc. ("NFS") as a result of the lien foreclosure sale, and 
finally with Randolf Lewis, as the assignee of NFS. 
The Sallaz attorney's fee lien, as construed below, was only imposed against Mitchell's 
undivided half interest in the Nampa property. (Ex. pg. 42/880). In the proceedings below 
concerning the foreclosure of that lien Matthews has repeatedly attempted to raise defenses that only 
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his ex-wife Mitchell had standing to assert. Because Mitchell could not be located she was served 
by publication in the Canyon County lien foreclosure proceeding. (Aff. of Sallaz; Ex. pg 220/880). 
She did not appear and a default judgment was entered against her on August 19, 2009. (Ex., pp. 
146-47/880). 
Although the Court in the Canyon County attorney's lien foreclosure proceeding did include 
within the November 2, 2009 Default Judgment a statement of satisfaction of liens by priority, 
beginning with the first priority IHFA deed of trust, National Financial, as the foreclosing party, had 
earlier in July 2009 entered into a stipulation with IHF A that it would retain its first priority lien, 
"regardless of the outcome of the instant action." (Ex. pp. 159-160/880). The District Court entered 
an order recognizing this stipulation for IHFA to retain its first prior lien on August 19, 2009. (Ex. 
pp. 148-49/880). IHF A's first lien priority was preserved in the foreclosure of the attorney lien that 
ultimately occurred. 
The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale (R., pp. 29-31) indicates that National Financial's $10,000 
credit bid only purchased, "the right, claim and interest of the Defendant, as aforesaid, in and to 
the real estate particularly describe as follows," [legal description omitted] . . . and the Sheriff 
hereby gives Plaintiff, National Financial Service, Inc., possession of the aforesaid real property." 
( emphasis added). To the same effect is the Sheriff's Deed (R., pg. 32) stating, "for the rights, claim 
and interest of the aforesaid Defendant [Jacqueline Matthews], in and to the real estate particularly 
described above and the Sheriff hereby gives possession of said real property Plaintiff." (bracketed 
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reference added). 
The net effect of the Canyon County attorney lien foreclosure proceeding was to only 
substitute National Financial Services, Inc. ("NFS") for Matthews' ex-wife Jacqueline as a tenant 
in common owner with Matthews of the Nampa property. Matthews' continuing obligation as the 
sole individual responsible on the underlying note and deed of trust to IHF A remained unimpaired 
as a result of that Canyon County foreclosure action. 
Sometime after the entry of the lien foreclosure judgment, National Financial Services 
transferred its undivided half interest in the Nampa property to an individual, Randolph Lewis. (R. 
pg. 105 "It is not clear when, or under what circumstances, Lewis came into title of the subject 
property from Sallaz or National Financial Services."). Prior to the time of the issuance of the 
Sheriffs Deed in May 2011, Matthews had on January 5, 2011 already commenced another action 
in Ada County, now known as the Ada County accounting action, in which Dennis Sallaz, Raymond 
Schild, National Financial Services, Inc, and "DO Es" were named as defendants. Ada County Case 
No. CV-OC2011-00140. 
In the Ada County accounting action Matthews alleged five claims. 3 Two claims as based 
upon circumventing the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure by: (1) not filing the Canyon County 
3 As noted above in the Course of Proceedings, the District Court reviewed the contents 
of the court files in the 2002 .Matthews' divorce proceeding, the 2009 Canyon County lien 
proceeding, and the 2011 Ada County accounting action. (R., pg. 113). Although the District Court 
declared that it would take judicial notice of the contents of those files, "as referenced herein", it 
appears that no portion of the 2011 Ada County accounting proceeding court file has been included 
within the "exhibit" that has been submitted as a part of the record on this appeal. 
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attorney's lien foreclosure action within the required statute oflimitations; and (2) by not renewing 
that attorney's fee lien. A third claim for circumventing the bankruptcy rules. A fourth claim 
alleging that the Defendants had circumvented Judge Ford's order by selling the Nampa property 
prior to trial. A fifth claim of conspiracy with IHF A to sell the Nampa property at a discounted rate. 
(R.,pg.118). 
In the Ada County accounting action Judge McKee ruled that Matthews could not collaterally 
attack the Canyon County lien foreclosure judgment and that Matthews lacked standing to assert 
defenses which only his ex-wife could raise as to matters that only affected the lien interest on her 
undivided half interest in the property. (R., pp. 99-109; 119). In the findings of fact issued by Judge 
McKee he noted that the parties had caused a quitclaim deed to be recorded which appeared to 
satisfy Matthews as to most of the claims he had listed above, leaving only the accounting matter to 
be resolved by the court. Judge McKee summarized the situation involving the effect of that 
quitclaim deed as follows: 
At the commencement of proceedings, the parties advised the Court that the 
Defendants had caused to be recorded a quitclaim deed evidencing that the subject 
property was now titled in the names of, and held by, Terrence Matthew and 
Randolph Lewis. The Plaintiff acknowledged on the record that said deed was 
executed and recorded, and that he was satisfied that it sufficiently defined his 
interest in the land. The Defendant(s) had previously transferred their interest to 
Randolph Lewis. Lewis is not a party, but was present with counsel. The Court was 
advised that the Plaintiff was satisfied that this quitclaim deed completely resolved 
the first issue, and that no further consideration was required to the quiet title matter. 
As to this first issue, then, the Court will direct that the Complaint be dismissed 
October 5, 2012 Findings of Fact (R., pg. 102). Somehow, Matthews has misconstrued the quitclaim 
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deed that was recorded as a part of the Ada County accounting proceeding as a return to him of title 
to the Nampa property which he alleges he lost as a result of the Canyon County lien foreclosure 
proceeding. That is not what occurred. The only function of that quitclaim deed was to confirm for 
the benefit of all parties that only Matthews and Lewis were at that time the owners of the Nampa 
property, each holding an undivided 50% share. Matthews' 50% share had arisen at the time of his 
2002 divorce. Lewis' 50% share had been obtained from NFS, which in turn had obtained its 
interest through the lien foreclosure of Mitchell's share as a result of the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure proceeding. 
In the accounting part of the action, Judge McKee determined that for the period between 
March 2011 through September 2012 the Nampa property was essentially "upside down." Total 
rental receipts had been $13,900, while overall total expenses had been $19,172. In applying the rule 
that an owner in possession is obliged to account to his co-owner for "net rents and profits" received 
from the property, Judge McKee undertook the following calculation, while momentarily setting 
aside the $14,700 mortgage payment made during the period to be subsequently attributed based 
upon a determination of which owner had the obligation on the IHF A mortgage loan: 
$13,900 less operating expenses $2,268 = $11,632 in net rents 
$11,632 2 = $5,816 in net rents to be distributed to each owner. 
If each owner was equally obligated on the mortgage debt, then $5,816 - 7,350 = -$1,534 
If only Matthews was obligated on the mortgage debt, then $5,816 -14, 700 = -$8,884 
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Judge McKee then concluded that under either scenario, it had cost more to manage the 
Nampa property than that property had generated in rent, such that Matthews was not entitled to any 
payment of "net rentals" which had been received by his co-tenants, as being either National 
Financial or Lewis (R., pg. 107). Essentially there had been no "net rentals," but instead a "net loss," 
no matter, how the mortgage obligation was attributed between the two owners. 
Consequently, at the conclusion of the Ada County accounting action, as clearly based upon 
the quitclaim deed that was recorded as a part of the settlement of that action (R., pg. 102), Lewis 
and Matthews were thereafter considered to be 50/50 common owners of the Nampa property. 
Nonetheless, Matthews remained the sole obligor under the deed of trust obligation owed to IHFA. 
Shortly thereafter Mr. Lewis ceased making the monthly mortgage payments on the property 
and moved out of the residence. (Sallaz Aff., i117, R., pg. 97). As a consequence of the resulting 
default that arose under the deed of trust obligation, IHF A in March 2013 foreclosed against Mr. 
Matthews upon its underlying deed of trust and extinguished both co-tenants' ownership interest in 
the Nampa property.4 
When Matthews commenced the proceeding directly underlying this appeal in April 2013 
the facts that he alleged in support of his claims were no different than those that had been previously 
4 Matthews has attached several documents outside the record on appeal at the end of 
his Appellant's Brief. Documents appended to a brief, not otherwise properly submitted as evidence 
in the record, may not be relied upon to support an argument made on appeal. See Woods v. Sanders, 
150 Idaho 53, 58,244 P.3d 197,202 (2010). Nonetheless, the attached March 19, 2013 letter from 
attorney Charles Fawcett indicates that apparently both Matthews and co-tenant Lewis each received 
$8,503.90 in net proceeds from the final foreclosure sale of the Nampa property. 
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raised and decided in the Canyon County lien foreclosure action, and those that had been pled in the 
Ada County accounting action, which Judge McKee had refused to consider on the basis that those 
claims were foreclosed by the judgment entered in the Canyon County lien foreclosure action. 
In this case it was even more difficult to ascertain whether Mr. Matthews had alleged any 
facts constituting causes of action that are recognized under Idaho's notice pleading standards. (R., 
pp. 61-62). Matthews claimed damages arising from an alleged "forgery" committed by Dennis 
Sallaz" by signing a motion to dismiss in the Canyon County lien foreclosure action (R., pg. 96 -
Sallaz Aff., ,I 13; R., pg. 16). Matthews also claimed that Sallaz had perjured himself by testifying 
that National Financial Services had tendered a $7,500.00 check to catch up an arrearage on the 
Nampa property. That check was in fact tendered, (R., pg. 24; Modrow Aff., ,I 5; Check Copy, R., 
pg. 26), and was included by IHF A's transaction history for the loan (Ex. pg. 9/880). 
Matthews again claimed that the Canyon County lien foreclosure proceeding went forward 
in violation of applicable statutes of limitation and bankruptcy protection. Judge Ford and Judge 
McKee both had noted that such defenses belonged only to Matthews' ex-wife to assert, and that she 
had defaulted. Judge McKee had stated there was no discernible bankruptcy issue to be addressed 
in the Ada County case. (R., pg. 119). 
Finally, Matthews had made a broad and general allegation that the defendants had directly 
caused the loss of the Nampa property in 20i3. At the end of the Ada County accounting action, 
Matthews had failed to established that anyone within the Sallaz group of defendants had any 
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enforceable obligation to make the payments secured by the deed of trust. Matthews and Lewis were 
the tenant in common owners of the property, but only Matthews was obligated upon the underlying 
promissory note to IHF A, and only Matthews had secured the payment of that note by the deed of 
trust obligation on the Nampa property. Consequently, no one other than Mr. Matthews had any 
responsibility for the payment of the obligation secured by that deed of trust on Nampa property. 
Therefore, even as most broadly read and understood, all of the facts stated, and all of the 
claims raised in the Appellant Matthews' September 8, 2014 Amended Complaint had been 
previously raised, addressed, and reduced to final judgment as alleged against the named defendants 
or their privies; such that the bar of res judicata prohibited all of his claims from going forward in 
that action. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question on appeal of whether res judicata barred the claims asserted below, presents an 
issueoflawsubjectto free review. Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,555, 768 P.2d 815,818 (Ct.App. 
1989). See also, Baird Oil Co., Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm., 144 Idaho 229,231, 159 P.3d 866,868 
(2007). As stated in Waller v. Dept o.f Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 192 P.3d 1058 (2008): 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this Comi uses 
the same standard a district court uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanton, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613,616 (2007); Jordan v. 
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Ali facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ticor Title 
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Co., 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616 (citing R.G. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 
409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990)). 
"Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,885, 173 P.3d 
1141, 1144 (2007) (quoting Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 
(2002)). Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the 
same parties to an earlier litigation is a question of law upon which this Court 
exercises free review. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616 (citing 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312,319, 78 P.3d 379,386 (2003)). "Res judicata is an 
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements 
by a preponderance of the evidence." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P .3d at 
616 (citing Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883,890, 841 P.2d 413,420 
(1992)). 
146 Idaho at 237, 192 P.3d at 1061. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, that issue either must have been raised in the court 
below, or have been subject to an adverse ruling by the court below. Bank o..f Commerce v. Jefferson 
Enterprises, LLC, 154 Idaho 824, 828-29, 303 P.3d 183, 187-88 (2013); andKolarv. Cassia County, 
Idaho, 142 Idaho 346,354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court erred is granting summary judgment for the 
Defendant/Respondents on the basis of res judicata? 
B. Whether the Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal 
under LC.§ 12-121? 
C. Whether sanctions under I.A.R. 11.2 should be imposed against the Appellant 
Matthews on this appeal? 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment For The Defendant/ 
Respondents On The Basis Of Res Judicata 
In the proceeding below the District Court had characterized the claims raised by Matthews, 
which he had alleged in his amended complaint (R., pp. 52-63), as stating four causes of action. 
Those four causes of action were summarized as follows by the District Court in its March 4, 2015 
Memorandum Decision issued on Matthews' motion for summary judgment: 
In the Amended Complaint, Matthews asserts four (4) causes of action: (1) Sallaz 
forged Raymond Schild' s name on documents in the Canyon County lien foreclosure 
action to initiate the sale of the Nampa home; (2) Sallaz perjured himself in his 
testimony during the 2011 Ada County action that the $7,500 was issued to catch up 
payments and back taxes on the Nampa Property; (3) Circumvention of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Bankruptcy Rules; and (4) Defendants failed 
to keep payments current on the Nampa home and testified to the court that all 
payments were current. Matthews named as Defendants Dennis Sallaz, Daryl Sallaz 
[footnote omitted], NFS, and Randolf Lewis. 
R., pg. 121 (bracketed reference to, "footnote omitted," added). 
Idaho is a notice pleading state. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 
(1986). Under notice pleading standards a plaintiff is not required to state particular theories for 
relief, but instead need only provide a short and plain statement of claims which indicate that the 
pleader is entitled to relief. Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 
1277, 1280 (2002). In that spirit, the defendants in this action attempted to characterize the facts that 
had been pled by Matthews within the scope of recognized Idaho causes of action. Nonetheless, 
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even under Idaho's liberal notice pleading standards a complaint cannot stand that fails to provide 
notice of a claim, or that simply fails to state any claims. Youngblood v. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 
668-69, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202-03 (2008). 
Matthews' four claims appeared to present causes of action for: (1) forgery, (2) perjury, (3) 
abuse of process, and ( 4) a broadly-state claim of fraud, or perhaps "wrongful foreclosure." In 
opposing these claims on Matthews' motion for summary judgment, in addition to raising the bar 
of res judicata, the defendants also argued that each of these four claims, was either factually or 
legally insufficient to present an actionable claim, and therefore should be dismissed on that basis. 
(R., pp. 85-92). The District Court, while recognizing these alternative arguments (R., pg. 122), 
made its decision entirely on the basis ofres judicata. (R., pp. 123-129). 
Three requirements must be established for the application of res judicata: (1) the same 
parties, or their privies, (2) the same claim, and (3) a final judgment. Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 
774, 777, 186 P.3d 630, 633 (2008). The bar of prior adjudication which arises under the doctrine 
of res judicata provides that not only those issues that have been previously adjudicated are barred 
in any subsequent adjudication, but also those issues that could have been previously litigated are 
also barred from being pursued in any subsequent adjudication. Kootenai Electric Cooperative v. 
Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120, 219 P.3d 440, 444 (2009) ("Additionally, this Court has 
interpreted claim preclusion to hinge on whether the matter 'might and should have been litigated 
in the first suit."'). In this context, the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, is not directed 
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at merely weeding out those specific claims that actually have been previously adjudicated, but also 
the dis-favored practice of claim-splitting. Kootenai Electric, 148 Idaho at 122, 219 P.3d at 446 
("the rule against splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or form of relief demanded in 
one suit are different from those demanded in another." Citing to, Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 
92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002); and Wingv. Hulet, l 06 Idaho 912,916,684 P.2d 314,318 (Ct.App. 
1984)). 
After reviewing the cases files from the Matthews' 2002 divorce action, the 2009 lien 
foreclosure action, and the 2011 Ada County accounting action, the District Court in the summary 
judgment proceeding below determined that each of the four claims alleged by Matthews in this 
action was barred by res judicata, as either having been previously raised, or that could have been 
raised (presumably by someone with standing), in those earlier actions. 
1. Forgery 
The District Court properly concluded that res judicata barred Matthews' forgery claim as 
alleged against Sallaz. 5 As based upon the record before this Court, the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure proceeding had gone to final judgment (R., pp. 20-21 ). Both of Matthews attempted 
appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court arising out of that proceeding had been dismissed (Ex. pg. 
5 Although at this point, perhaps of only passing interest, there appears to have been 
no actual "forgery," in respect to the signature on the motion to dismiss in the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure action as alleged by Matthews. This is because the document in question (R., pg. 16), 
contains Sallaz's own signature as submitted in substitute of Schild. A forgery, in the context 
alleged here by Matthews, by definition requires an attempt to "counterfeit" the handwriting of 
another. See e.g., LC. § 18-3601. 
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85/880 "Remittitur" referencing 10/15/09 dismissal of appeal); and, (Ex. pp. 422-23/880) ( 12/22/10 
Order dismissing appeal on the basis that the issue raised by appellant (writ of prohibition) was 
moot, and consequently there was no relief that could be provided on appeal). 
In the Canyon County lien foreclosure action Judge Ford had ruled that only Jacqueline 
Mitchell had standing to defend those claims: 
The record of this case shows that Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. represented 
Mitchell in her divorce from Matthews and one result of that divorce was a 
determination that Mitchell and Matthews would each retain a 50% interest in the 
subject property in Nampa, Idaho. Thus, this court finds that the Attorney Lien filed 
by the law firm, and which National now seeks to foreclose, was a result of the 
"client's cause of action ... and judgment" that is, the divorce decree entered 
between Mitchell and Matthews. Thus, the Attorney's Lien at issue is valid lien 
capable of adjudication and enforcement. 
The court is aware of Matthews' objection to the amount of money being 
sought against Mitchell, and is cognizant of the disparity between the Attorney's Lien 
for $3400 plus costs and the Default Judgment which seeks an excess of $34,000. 
However, Mitchell has not appeared in this action, default judgment has been entered 
against her, and the court finds that she is the only party who had the standing 
to contest either the validity of the Attorney's Lien or the amount now sought 
pursuant to the lien. So while the court may be sympathetic to Matthews' 
objections to the amount of the judgment, Matthews is not in the position to object 
on either ground and has been so instructed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Feb. 12,2010 Memorandum Decision at pg. 8 (Ex. pg. 315/880) ( emphasis added). That declaration 
by Judge Ford that Jacqueline Mitchell was the only party who had the required "standing" to contest 
the validity of the Attorney's lien included every possible question of amount, renewal, the property 
that could be attached, statute of limitations, and any and every other matter of substance or 
procedure concerning the potential satisfaction of that lien. Nothing changed when Mitchell allowed 
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those matters to be determined by default, by not entering an appearance and not defending the case. 
In the 2011 Ada County accounting action Judge McKee had declared that, "Any legal 
defense or defect in the Canyon County litigation must be addressed to the court in Canyon County, 
not here. The judgment and orders of the Canyon County court leading to the sheriffs sale are final, 
binding an conclusive." (R., pg. 103). 
In sum, no interest of Matthews was adversely affected by the outcome of the Canyon County 
lien foreclosure action. That matter was resolved by final judgment entered on March 28, 2011 (R., 
pp. 20-21), which precluded Matthews from again raising and relitigating those same issues in the 
Ada County accounting action, or in the action underlying this appeal (R., pg. 103). Therefore, the 
District Court below correctly ruled that Matthews was precluded from raising the matter again on 
the basis of res judicata. (R. pg. 124-25). This matter has been entirely concluded as to the claims 
of Matthews ex-wife, Mitchell. Matthews has no actionable claims for forgery, or otherwise. 
2. Perjury 
The District Court properly concluded that res judicata barred Matthews alleged pe1jury 
claim.6 The claim as summarized by the District Court below was stated as follows: 
Matthews' second cause of action alleges Sallaz committed perjury when he testified 
in the Ada County action that he tendered a $7,500 cashier's check on behalf of NFS 
6 As defined at LC. § 18-5401: "Every person who, having taken an oath that he will 
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, officer, 
or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may be law be administered, wilfully and 
contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, is guiity of 
perjury." 
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to catch up on payments due on the Nampa home. 
(R., pg. 125). 
Matthews appears to labor under the misapprehension that the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure action both extinguished his title to the Nampa property and then required Sallaz to make 
the payments on the IHFA first lien deed of trust obligation. He has alleged, "perjury" because he 
believes the $7,500 check was not applied by IHFA to cure an arrearage in the monthly mortgage 
payments that Sallaz was allegedly obligated to make as the co-tenant in possession of the property. 
(R., pp. 24-26 (Ex. pg. 9/880, IHF A ledger indicating the application of the $7500 check). 
Similar to Matthews' allegation concerning the forgery claim, there are questions in respect 
to this allegation as to whether anything occurred that could be characterized as "perjury," and if so, 
whether a civil cause of action is recognized under Idaho law that would afford any relief. The 
$7,500 check that Matthews refers to was actually tendered to IHFA (R., pp. 24-26). The proposed 
assumption or refinance of the IHFA loan never occurred. Whatever the reason, mere speculation 
about potential future events cannot be the basis upon which perjury or fraud is determined. April 
Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 510, 328 P.3d 480, 490 (2014). The question as to 
whether an "interest" of Matthews in the Nampa property was affected by the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure proceeding was denied relitigation in the Ada County accounting proceeding, and is 
likewise barred by res judicata in this proceeding. 
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3. Circumvention Of Civil & Bankruptcy Rules (Abuse of Process} 
The District Court properly concluded that res judicata barred Matthews' alleged claim of 
circumvention of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicable statute of limitations, and the 
Federal Bankruptcy Rules ( abuse of process), because NFS had foreclosed on the attorney lien 
against Jacqueline's undivided half interest in the Nampa home. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, as set out above, in the course of the Canyon County lien 
foreclosure proceeding IHF A and NFS had entered into a stipulation (Ex. pp. 159-160/880) that the 
Court had incorporated in an Order (Ex. pp. 148-49/880), which provided by that IHFA would retain 
its first priority lien, "regardless of the outcome of the instant action." The Judgment upon which 
NFS proceeded in foreclosing the lien interest was entered on November 2, 2009 (Ex. pp. 73-
77 /880). Matthews had moved for summary judgment in that action, and the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision on that motion was handed down on February 12,2010, a copy of which was 
served upon Matthews by the Clerk of the Court. As relevant to the questions presented here, 
concerning the November 2, 2009 judgment the Court declared: 
In essence, that judgment forecloses any lien interest Defendant Beeman may 
have had in the subject property, awards a money judgment against Defendant 
Mitchell, and determines that title to the subject property is held 50% by 
Defendant Matthews and 50% by National, and is encumbered by the first lien 
of IHFA and the second lien of National. The judgment directs that a foreclosure 
sale shall be held with proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien oflHF A 
then to pay off the second lien held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be 
split equally between Defendant Matthews and National. 
Feb. 12, 2010 Memorandum Decision at pg. 4 (Ex. pg. 311/880) (emphasis added). Further on in 
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the decision, Judge Ford declared, "This Judgement allows National to foreclose the lien against 
Mitchell's 50% interest in the subject property and National is seeking to do so through a 
foreclosure sale of the property." Feb. 12,2010 Memorandum Decision at pg. 6 (Ex. pg. 313/880) 
( emphasis added). 
Matthews has placed a great deal of emphasis on the second sentence in the above quoted 
block, concerning the required payment of the IHF A first lien obligation from the foreclosure sale 
proceeds prior to the satisfaction of the National Financial' s second lien obligation, with the apparent 
consequent effect that his obligation under the IHF A lien would be extinguished due to the 
foreclosure sale. That never happened. 
Because the lien foreclosure sale on September 16, 2010 was accomplished by means a 
$10,000 credit bid that was made by National Financial, that sale had the effect of satisfying the 
November 2, 2009 lienjudgment by the transfer of Mitchell's 50% undivided interest in the Nampa 
property to National Financial. This outcome is indicated by the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale (R., 
pp. 29-31) and by the Sheriffs Deed (R., pg. 32). 
Matthews remained a 50% owner of the Nampa property - completely unaffected by the 
foreclosure sale. Matthews' obligation under the IHF A first lien deed of trust remained completely 
unaffected by that lien foreclosure sale. 
Because only Matthews' ex-wife Mitchell's interest was affected by the lien, and the 
subsequent lien foreclosure sale, she is the only one who had standing to raise any applicable 
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defenses and to contest that sale. She chose not to and to allow her interest to be taken by default. 
Matthews had no standing to assert her rights for her. The matter has gone to final judgment. Those 
claims are now barred by res judicata. Those claims cannot be readjudicated in this action, or in any 
subsequent action. They are barred. The District Court was correct in dismissing Matthews' claims. 
4. The Alleged "Wrongful Foreclosure" Of The Nampa Property In 2013 As 
Allegedly Caused By Acts Of The Defendants/Respondents 
In his fourth cause of action Matthews completely ignores the actual outcomes of the 2009 
Canyon County lien foreclosure proceeding, and of the subsequent 2011 Ada County accounting 
proceeding. Instead, he alleged the following as the fourth claim in his amended complaint: 
4. Defendant Sallaz and National Financial Services caused the 
foreclosure of Nampa property, and which was co-owned by Plaintiff, who's [sic] 
loan was still in effect so all parties could have (who ever had control) made and kept 
payments current, filed after the statute of limitations, when plaintiff was granted 
half-ownership, the defendants failed to make and keep current past and current 
payments where they testified to the court that the payments, taxes and insurance 
were current. Keep the monies received from rents, kept the cashier check to catch 
up the arrears, and allowed the property to be foreclosed, and the Third District Court 
Judge said that upon the sale of the property that Idaho Housing be paid first, and if 
not (payments kept current) and was told "you better not lose the property." 
R., pg. 62 ( emphasis added). 
Because of its significance to the resolution of this case, Judge McKee's finding in the 2011 
Ada County accounting action on this question has been previously set out above in the Statement 
of Facts, and now is again set out here: 
At the commencement of proceedings, the parties advised the Court that the 
Defendants had caused to be recorded a quitclaim deed evidencing that the subject 
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property was now titled in the names of, and held by, Terrence Matthew and 
Randolph Lewis. The Plaintiff acknowledged on the record that said deed was 
executed and recorded, and that he was satisfied that it sufficiently defined his 
interest in the land. The Defendant(s) had previously transferred their interest 
to Randolph Lewis. Lewis is not a party, but was present with counsel. The Court 
was advised that the Plaintiff was satisfied that this quitclaim deed completely 
resolved the first issue, and that no further consideration was required to the quiet 
title matter. As to this first issue, then, the Court will direct that the Complaint be 
dismissed 
October 5, 2012 Findings of Fact (R., pg. 102) (emphasis added). 
This finding by Judge McKee dovetails with the earlier finding by Judge Ford, entered over 
six years ago, that after the lien foreclosure judgment, the Nampa property remained "encumbered 
by the first lien of IHF A." There has never been any evidence brought forth in this matter that 
anyone, other than Matthews alone, was obligated on the IHF A deed of trust. See e.g., IHF A "2/8/02 
Payoff Statement" (Ex., pg. 833/880). 
In essence, that judgment forecloses any lien interest Defendant Beeman may 
have had in the subject property, awards a money judgment against Defendant 
Mitchell, and determines that title to the subject property is held 50% by 
Defendant Matthews and 50% by National, and is encumbered by the first lien 
of IHF A and the second lien of National. The judgment directs that a foreclosure 
sale shall be held with proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien ofIHF A, 
then to pay off the second lien held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be 
split equally between Defendant Matthews and National. 
Feb. 12, 2010 Memorandum Decision at pg. 4 (Ex. pg. 311 /880) ( emphasis added). 
Clearly, after the entry of the final judgment in the Ada County accounting action on October 
5, 2012, (R., pp. 99-100), neither the "Defendant Sallaz" [nor] "National Financial Services," as 
alleged in Matthews' fourth claim had any further claim to possession of, or any right to the control 
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of, or any ownership in, the Nampa property. That situation probably actually existed even further 
back in time to when the Sheriffs Deed was issued (R., pg. 32) to National Financial, since 
ownership of the former Mitchell interest in the property was allegedly transferred to Lewis 
sometime shortly after that foreclosure. (R., pg. 96, Sallaz Aff. ,i 14; R. pg. 105 "It is not clear when, 
or under what circumstances, Lewis came into title of the subject property from Sallaz or National 
Financial Services.") 
At the time this action was commenced in April 2013, Matthews and Lewis had been 
co tenants of the Nampa property for about two years. Neither the factual, nor the legal grounds upon 
which Matthews alleged this claim, as arising out of the Canyon County lien foreclosure action and 
the Ada County accounting action, actually existed, and as now well-established he lacks any 
standing to raise any claims that all related to his ex-wife Mitchell's interest in the property, or to 
challenge the final judgments on the questions decided in those cases. 
In the complete absence of any factual basis of either an ownership interest in the property, 
or a legal obligation to make loan payments, the District Court properly concluded that res judicata 
barred Matthews' alleged fourth claim, on the basis that the facts raised and alleged by Matthews 
in that claim were nothing more than, "the same claims that were raised in the 2011 Ada County 
action and the 2009 attorney lien foreclosure action. The decisions of these prior proceedings cannot 
be attacked collaterally in this proceeding. (R., pg. 127). 
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B. The Appellant Matthews Has Failed To Raise Any Issue On This Appeal That Has 
Challenged Decision Of The District Court In Granting Summary Judgment To The 
Respondents 
On this appeal Matthews has not directly challenged the decision of the District Court in 
entering summary judgment against him, and instead granting summary judgment for the 
Defendant/Respondents on all four of the claims that he had alleged in his amended complaint. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, that issue either must have been raised in the court 
below, or have been subject to an adverse ruling by the court below. Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson 
Enterprises, LLC, 154 Idaho 824, 828-29, 303 P.3d 183, 187-88 (2013); and Kolar v. Cassia County, 
Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005). An issue cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher, 157 Idaho 577,581,338 P.3d 556,560 
(2014), citing to, Sadidv. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932,941,265 P.3d 114, 1153 (2011). 
Nonetheless, Matthews has framed seven separate issues, none of which directly addresses 
the District Court's decision to dismiss all of the claims he had presented in his amended complaint 
on the basis of res judicata. Therefore the relief that Matthews requests on this appeal can be denied 
solely on the basis that he has failed to raise and argue any issue that was subject to District Court's 
adverse res judicata ruling below. 
In the hope of finally putting this matter to rest, the seven arguments Matthews has raised in 
his opening brief will be addressed for the purpose of setting forth the argument that Matthews has 
presented nothing new, and nothing that has not been raised previously, and nothing that is not 
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subject to the District Court's res judicata ruling. 
Matthews' first, second and seventh arguments, as made at pp. 23-26, & 3 5 of his Appellant's 
Brief all are based upon the same erroneous assumption. This assumption is that the Canyon County 
lien foreclosure action divested Matthews of his ownership interest in the Nampa property and 
simultaneously relieved him of any further responsibility to make monthly payments on the IHF A 
deed of trust obligation. Matthews argues that he regained his 50% interest in the Nampa property 
at the time of the quitclaim deed transfer in the Ada County action. 
Matthews has not included in the record on appeal any of the transcripts from the proceedings 
below. It is the appellant's responsibility to ensure that an adequate record is presented on appeal, 
including transcripts, to support the issues raised. Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Construction, Inc., 144 
Idaho 171, 1 73, 158 P .3d 94 7, 949 (2007). In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, the 
appellate court must presume that the absent record supports the decision below. Id. Consequently, 
his argument that Judge Owen's declaration that at all times in this matter Matthews had remained 
the sole obligor on the underlying loan obligation as secured by the IHF A deed of trust constituted 
a, "surprise ruling," and a "bombshell," is not supported by the record on appeal. In fact it is 
spurious and quite disingenuous. 
Consequently, the question, as raised in Matthews first and seventh arguments, as to who 
remained responsible for the mortgage payments on the Nampa property was clearly addressed by 
Judge Ford six years ago. IHFA's first lien remained intact and unaffected by that lien foreclosure 
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sale. Matthews undivided halfinterest in the Nampa property was unaffected by that lien foreclosure 
sale. The question as to the extent of National Financial's lien, as only attaching to Mitchell's 
undivided 50% interest in the property, as raised in Matthews' second argument, was also clearly 
addressed at that time, and the result of the Sheriffs sale also indicates it was only Mitchell's portion 
of the property that was affected by that sale. These same arguments, in their various permutations, 
have been repetitively asserted by Matthews, and repeatedly rejected. They are now barred by res 
judicata. The dispositive rulings on these questions by Judge McKee and Judge Ford have been set 
out at pp. 28 & 29 of this brief, and need not be repeated here. 
Matthews' third, fourth, and fifth arguments (Appellant's Brief pp. 26-33), are simply re-
treads of the violation of the civil rules, bankruptcy rules, and statute of limitation arguments that 
he has previously attempted to present in both the 2009 Canyon County lien foreclosure action, and 
in the 2011 Ada County accounting action, and that already have been addressed in the response 
presented here. These questions, in the context now raised, were fully addressed by Judge Ford as 
to Matthews ex-wife's claims. Notwithstanding the fact that Matthews has repeatedly been advised 
he has no standing to raise these issues, the courts below have been painstakingly patient to provide 
Matthews with an explanation of the controlling rules, as Judge Ford did in the response set out 
below, on these very same questions, which Matthews has again attempted to interject into this 
appeal in the guise of these three arguments: 
The record of this case shows that Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. represented 
Mitcheil in her divorce from Matthews and one result of that divorce was a 
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determination that Mitchell and Matthews would each retain a 50% interest in the 
subject property in Nampa, Idaho. Thus, this court finds that the Attorney Lien filed 
by the law firm, and which National now seeks to foreclose, was the result of the 
"client's cause of action ... and judgment" that is, the divorce decree entered 
between Mitchell and Matthews. Thus, the Attorney's Lien at issue is a valid lien 
capable of adjudication and enforcement. 
The court is aware of Matthews' objection to the amount of money being 
sought against Mitchell, and is cognizant of the disparity between the Attorney's Lien 
for $3400 plus costs and the Default Judgment which seeks an excess of $34,000. 
However, Mitchell has not appeared in this action, default judgment has been entered 
against her, and the court finds that she is the only party who had the standing to 
contest either the validity of the Attorney's Lien or the amount now sought pursuant 
to the lien. So while the court may be sympathetic to Matthew's objections to the 
amount of the judgment, Matthews is not in the position to object on either ground 
and has been so instructed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Frazee and Heslip Cases 
In support of his argument that National should not be allowed to proceed 
with the foreclosure sale of his property, Matthews cites to Frazee v. Frazee, l 04 
Idaho 463, 660 P.2d 928 (1983), and Heslip v. Heslip, 74 Idaho 368,262 P.2d 999 
(1953). In Frazee, after a divorce action, wife's attorney filed a lien against the 
divorce action and then filed a motion to foreclose the lien on the grounds that his 
client had not paid her share of the awarded attorney's fees. The court found that the 
attorney could not file the lien because the issue of unpaid attorney's fee had not been 
adjudicated. The court noted that when his client failed to pay the amount due, the 
attorney then turned to the opposing party, husband, to collect the debt. The court 
refused to hold that the attorney was not required to adjudicate the amount of 
attorney's fees due and that the attorney could simply attempt to levy on husband's 
property, despite the fact that husband was not a party to the contract between wife 
and attorney. The court stated "[t]he equitable source of the claimed charging lien 
necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to 
perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court. Here no such process 
was followed, but rather Reeves sought a writ of execution against Kenneth Frazee 
with any opportunity for Frazee to challenge the amount or propriety thereof." Id, at 
466, 931. 
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In the Heslip case, the trial court included the following language in the 
decree, 
That the counsel for plaintiff* * * be and he is hereby awarded the sum of 
One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars as attorney's fees, and the counsel for 
defendant * * * be and he is hereby awarded the sum of One Hundred Fifty-
five ($155.00) Dollars as attorney's fee. * * * that the attorneys [naming 
them] shall have a lien upon the real estate belong to the parties hereto for the 
unpaid portion for the attorneys' fees due them.' 
Heslip, 74 Idaho at 369,262 P.2d at 1000. 
In his reliance on the Heslip case, Matthews seems to rely on the following 
language from the decision, "[ w ]e know of no provision or authority, and none has 
been called or our attention, where the separate property of the wife, or real estate 
awarded to her in a divorce action, could be made subject to, and liable for, attorney 
fees contracted by the husband." Id, at 371, 1001. However, the court went on to 
state the following: 
The measure and mode of compensation for attorneys is a matter for 
agreement between the attorney and client. While the trial judge could, in 
this case he did not, require the husband to pay the attorney fees of the wife. 
As this was not done, there was no occasion to fix any attorney fees. Section 
3-205, LC., providing a lien for attorneys upon a client's cause of action, 
which attaches to the judgment, is not here involved." Id. 
In response to Matthews' motion, National argues that neither the Frazee 
case, nor Heslip case is controlling and neither supports Matthews' arguments. 
Specifically, National argues that this action is the adjudication of the attorney's fees 
and they have reduced the lien to a judgment. This court agrees. The contract 
between Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. and Mitchell required her to pay attorney's fees 
and costs incurred during the divorce proceedings, and having reduced the divorce 
action to a decree and judgment, Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. gained an interest in the 
outcome of that action, specifically an interest in Mitchell 50% ownership of the 
subject property. 
In this action, National is only seeking to foreclose the line on the portion of 
the property that is owned by Mitchell, which is 50% of the Nampa property. 
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Matthews wants to argue that by foreclosing the lien, National has taken his property 
and that this gives him standing to object to the foreclosure. The court recognizes 
that it may appear so due to the first priority lien of IHF A and large judgment 
National has obtained in this case against Mitchell. The court recognizes Matthews' 
concern is that there won't be any proceeds left over after the sale that would be 
given to him and the practical effect of this action and subsequent sale is that 
Matthews will likely lose his interest in the property as well and this may be the case. 
However, that issue is not before the court at this time. 
The court finds, as a matter of law, that the Attorney's Lien filed by Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd. has not been contested by Mitchell, who is the only party with 
standing to contest it. The court finds that pursuant to LC. 3-205 Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. has an interest in the subject Nampa property based on the divorce decree 
granting a 50% interest in the property to Mitchell. The court also find that due to 
Mitchell's failure to appear in this action, that Default has been entered and a Default 
Judgment has been entered against her. Therefore, the court denies Matthew' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the grounds that National, on behalf of Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd., is attempt to circumvent the legal system. 
Statute of Limitations 
Matthews' second argument in his motion for summary judgment is that 
National failed to file this action within the applicable statute of limitations as found 
in Idaho Code 5-216. Idaho Code 5-216 applies a five (5) year statute oflimitations 
on an action on a contract. Matthews argues that because the Attorney's Lien was 
recorded in 2002, this action having been filed in 2009 falls outside the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
The court finds that this is an issue that could have been raised and argued by 
Mitchell had she appeared in this action because it is her contact with her attorney 
that sets the basis for the Attorney's Lien at issue. However, because Mitchell failed 
to appear and Default Judgment has been entered against her, the court cannot allow 
Matthews to raise this argument on her behalf. 
Matthews' motion for summary judgment on the issue of an applicable statute 
of limitations bar to this action is denied. 
February i 2, 20 i O Memorandum Decision at pp. 8-11 (Ex. pp. 315-18/880). 
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Judge Ford's decision in 2010 establishes that Matthews has presented nothing to this Court 
on this appeal upon which the decision of the District Court should be reversed as based upon his 
arguments numbered three, four and five. Judge McKee held that here was no articulable bankruptcy 
issue (R., pg. 119) and to the extent that Matthews relies upon Judge Pappas' reasoning, as excerpted 
at pp. 28-29 of his Appellant's Brief, all that excerpt establishes is that the Sallaz Attorney's lien did 
not attach to Mr. Matthews's property, which was subject to bankruptcy protection at that time. 
Finally, as to Matthews' argument 6 (Appellant's Brief pp. 33-34) he attempts to argue that 
the alleged perjury he has placed at issue did not arise until after Judge McKee issued his ruling in 
the Ada County accounting action. The question, which Matthews attempted to place at issue below, 
was whether in the context of the alleged abuse of process claim, Sallaz had falsely testified in the 
Ada County accounting proceeding about the tender of the $7,500 check to cure the then-existing 
delinquency in the IHF A loan. The record on appeal supports the tender of the check by Sallaz (R., 
pp, 24-26) and its ultimate application to the loan (Ex., pg. 9/880). Matthews' attempt to shift the 
focus of his alleged perjury claim from the sworn testimony and evidence presented in the 2011 Ada 
County accounting proceeding, to events that occurred after that proceeding was concluded, is 
disingenuous at best. 
Matthews has no actionable claims against these defendants as arising out of the causes of 
action placed at issue below. Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the 
Defendant/Respondents should be affirmed. 
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C. The Respondents Are Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On Appeal Under J.C. 
§ 12-12-121 
Should the Respondents prevail on this appeal then they request an award of costs under 
I.A.R. 40, and also an award of attorney's fees under LC. § 12-121, as provided by I.A.R. 41. A 
party seeking an award of attorney's fees must support the claim with argument as well as authority. 
Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223,228,254 P.3d 1219, 1224 (2011). 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that in any civil action the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. An award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party under this 
statute is discretionary, Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927,935,342 P.3d 
639,647 (2015), not mandatory, and applies to appeals, Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 
Idaho 911,918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). 
In order for the responding party to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees under LC. § 12-
121 the Court must be left with an abiding belief that the appeal was brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280,286,311 P.3d 
292,298 (2013). The facts underlying the Court's decision to award attorney's fees under J.C.§ 12-
121 in the just-cited Steuerer v. Richards decision appear to somewhat parallel the circumstances 
presented in the current appeal, as brought by the Appellant Matthews: 
Here, Richards did not present a single legitimate issue on appeal. Not only 
were all of her claims without merit, but at times her contentions of error were 
directly and clearly rebutted by the district court's findings. She accepted the district 
court's factual findings but then appeared to question some of them in her argument. 
Thus, Richards brought this case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation 
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and Steuerer is therefore entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-121. 
155 Idaho at 286, 311 P.3d at 298. 
On this appeal, Matthews essentially ignored the res judicata decision of the District Court 
on the four claims he had asserted in his amended complaint. Instead, he again resuscitated and 
recycled old and rejected arguments that had been presented to, and rejected by, Judge Ford in the 
Canyon County lien foreclosure action; and that had also been presented to, and rejected by, Judge 
McKee in the Ada County accounting action; and that finally had been comprehensively reviewed 
and determined to be completely barred by Judge Owen in the District Court action underlying this 
appeal. On this basis, Matthews' appeal should be found to have been brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, such that an award of attorney's fees should be 
granted to the Respondents. 
In addition, the arguments presented by Matthews on this appeal have been largely 
incomprehensible, unreasonable, and lacking any foundation in applicable law, frequently doing 
nothing more stringing together arguments that had been presented by opposing counsel in the lower 
court proceedings, and also taken from the decision of the District Court in the proceedings below. 
Bowles v. Pro Jndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999). A great deal of time 
was required in responding to this appeal, as in responding the complaint, amended complaint, and 
the motion for summary judgment below, in just attempting to decipher what Matthews was 
attempting to place at issue, and determining what facts, if any, supported those claims. 
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Ultimately, Matthews has repeatedly refused to accept the admonitions first delivered to him 
over six years ago by both Judge Ford (Ex. pg. 315/880), and by the Idaho Supreme Court (Ex. pg. 
129/880), in the Canyon County lien foreclosure action that the claims he has repeatedly attempted 
to pursue up to the time of this appeal could only be pursued by his ex-wife, Jacqueline, and that 
those claims did not affect his ownership interest in the Nampa property. After the passage of this 
period of time, and through two subsequent civil actions (Ada County accounting action and this 
action), it should be clear that there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever that supports any of 
Matthews' alleged claims. Therefore, an award of attorney's fees to the respondents under LC.§ 12-
121 is justified on this appeal. 
D. This Court Should Impose Sanctions Under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 Against The 
Appellant Matthews For Pursing Issues That He Does Not Have Standing To Raise and 
Present To The Courts 
In responding to the issues raised, and the arguments made, by Matthews on this appeal, the 
Respondents also move for sanctions against him under I.A.R. 11.27 and I.A.R. 32. One of the 
7 Rule 11.2. Signing of notice of appeals, petitions, motions, briefs 
and other papers; sanctions 
(a) Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one ( 1) licensed attorney 
ofrecord of the state ofldaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall 
be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document and state the 
party's address. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that 
the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal. petition. motion. brief or 
other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -PAGE 40 
motivating reasons for this motion is that over six years ago, on September 9, 2009, Matthews, in 
attempting to appeal the decision of the court in the Canyon County lien proceeding, (Ex. pp. 131-
135/880), listed the following seven issues in his preliminary statement of the issues the Notice of 
Appeal of appeal that he filed with the Court: 
( a) Did plaintiff properly serve Jacqueline Mitchell where her last known address 
was is Beverly Hills, California? 
(b) How do you take $3,400 initial bill to over $31, 000? 
( c) Did plaintiffs file requisite lawsuit since filing a lien on the property in 
question? 
( d) Did plaintiffs file to re-new the lien within 2 year requisite time against the 
property? 
(e) Is plaintiff time-barred or tolled in collecting on a debt of over 7 years ago? 
(f) Didn't plaintiff already collect monies owed on a piece of properly Jacqueline 
gave counsel at Payette, Idaho? 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If the notice of 
appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of appeal, petition, 
motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(b) The court order may declare a party a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho 
Court Administrative Rule 59. 
(Emphasis added). 
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(g) Was this information given to the District Court Judge Ford in procedurely 
defaulting against Jacqueline? 
(Ex. pp. 132-133/880). 
At that time Matthews was clearly warned by the Supreme Court to not further proceed in 
attempting to raise issues for which only his ex-wife had standing to pursue. In the Supreme Court's 
September 16, 2009 Order conditionally dismissing that appeal (Ex. pp. 129-130/880), the following 
statement is included: 
It also appears that Terrence J. Matthews is attempting to represent Jacqueline 
Matthews Mitchell in violation of I.B.C.R. 800 and 801, the Unauthorized Practice 
of Law and I.A.R. 11.2, signing of notice of appeal. 
Ex. pg. 129/880. 
A party who appears pro se and signs a notice of appeal and signs a brief is subject to 
sanctions under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 987, 342 P.3d 907, 
914(2015) ("A party becomes subject to the rule the moment they sign a notice of appeal. ( citations 
omitted)."). Sanctions may be granted if either clause of the rule is violated: ( 1) the other party's 
arguments are not well grounds in fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, or (2) the 
claims were brought for an improper purpose, such an unnecessary delay or to increase the costs of 
litigation. Id. 
On this appeal, Matthews never directly addressed the res judicata decision of the District 
Court dismissing the four claims he had raised in his amended complaint. Instead, he recycled seven 
arguments previously presented, and also rejected, in earlier proceedings. He again primarily 
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attempts to raise and present matters that only relate to his ex-wife Jacqueline's interest in the 
Nampa property, for which he has no standing to assert. His other arguments were based, at best, 
on misstatements of the underlying facts, as to his own status as an owner of the property between 
its purchase in 1999 and that property's ultimate loss in the IHFA foreclosure in March 2013. 
Matthews has repeatedly and steadfastly ignored the clear statements made by Judge Ford, 
Judge McKee, Judge Owen, and even Judge Pappas in Matthews' bankruptcy proceeding, that the 
Sallaz attorney's fee lien only attached to his ex-wife Jacqueline's undivided half interest in the 
Nampa property, and that Matthews had no standing to pursue claims or defenses on her behalf, 
which she had abandoned and allowed to be decided by default. Ultimately, he has failed to raise 
any genuine appealable issue arising from the District Court's March 13, 2015 judgment, and on that 
basis sanctions under I.A.R. 11.2 should be awarded against him. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court dismissing the claims of the Appellant Matthews on the 
basis of res judicata should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted this 17th day of December, 2015. 
ary . 
Attorney for the Respondents 
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